Abstract. We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomialtime equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC '97), Regev (STOC '03, STOC '05), and Peikert (STOC '09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, as well as an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
to build subset-sum based public-key encryption schemes were met with little success, Impagliazzo and Naor were able to construct provably-secure primitives such as universal one-way hash functions, pseudorandom generators and bit-commitment schemes, based on the subset sum problem, that remain secure until this day [IN96] . The main difference between the public-key constructions and the "minicrypt" constructions in [IN96] is that the latter could be proved secure based on random instances of the standard subset sum problem, whereas the former modified the subset sum instances in order to allow decryption. Unfortunately, these modifications always seemed to introduce fatal weaknesses.
A provably-secure cryptosystem based on subset sum was finally constructed by Ajtai and Dwork [AD97] , who showed that their scheme is as hard to break as solving worst-case instances of a lattice problem called the "unique shortest vector problem." The reduction of subset sum to breaking their scheme is then obtained via the classic reduction from random subset sum to the unique shortest vector problem [LO85, Fri86] . While the Ajtai-Dwork and the subsequent latticebased cryptosystems [Reg03, Reg05, Pei09] are as hard to break as the average-case subset sum problem, these schemes are based on subset sum in a somewhat indirect way, and this causes their connection to the subset sum problem to not be as tight as possible.
In this work, we present a cryptosystem whose security is equivalent to the hardness of the SS(n, q n ) problem, where q is a positive integer of magnitudeÕ(n). Compared to the lattice-based cryptosystems, the subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker, and the proof of security is much simpler. We direct the reader to Section 1.2 for a more in-depth comparison between our scheme and the lattice-based ones.
In addition to our semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme, we present a semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol based on the same hardness assumption. We also show that a natural variant of our encryption scheme is resilient to key-leakage attacks (as formalized by Akavia et al. [AGV09] ), but under slightly stronger assumptions than our basic cryptosystem.
Our Contributions and Techniques
Semantically-secure public-key encryption. Our main contribution is a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is based directly on the hardness of the subset sum problem. The construction of our scheme is similar in spirit to the cryptosystem of Alekhnovich based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem [Ale03] , and that of Regev based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [Reg05] . Both of the aforementioned schemes are built from the assumption that for a randomly chosen matrix A ∈ Z m×n q , a random vector s ∈ Z n q , and some "small" noise vector c ∈ Z m q , the distribution (A, As + c) is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over Z m×(n+1) q . To construct our scheme, we show that the subset sum problem can be made to look very similar to the LWE problem. Then the main ideas (with a few technical differences) used in constructing cryptosystems based on LWE [Reg05, GPV08, Pei09] can be transferred over to subset sum.
Consider instances of the subset sum problem SS(n, q m ) where q is some small integer. If a is a vector in Z n q m and s is a vector in {0, 1} n , then a · s mod q m , written in base q, is equal to As + c mod q, where A ∈ Z m×n q is a matrix whose i-th column corresponds to a i written in base q, and c is a vector in Z m q that corresponds to the carries when performing "grade-school" addition. For example, let q = 10, m = n = 3, a = (738, 916, 375), and s = (0, 1, 1). Then a · s mod 10 3 = 916 + 375 mod 10 3 = 291, which can be written as addition in base q as follows:
where all operations are performed over Z q . The key observation is that the magnitude of the entries in the carries vector [ 0 1 0 ] T is at most n − 1, and so if q n, then As + c mod q ≈ As mod q. In fact, the elements of the vector c are distributed normally around n/2 with standard deviation √ n. In the instantiation of our scheme described in Section 3, we generate the elements in A from the range [− q−1 2 , q−1 2 ] and so the entries in the carries vector are normally distributed around 0 with standard deviation √ n. Readers familiar with the cryptosystems based on LWE [Reg05, GPV08, Pei09] should recognize the resemblance of the carry vector c to the noise vector in the LWE-based schemes. The main difference is that in the latter the noise vector is chosen independently at random, whereas in our scheme, the carries vector c occurs "naturally" and is completely determined by the matrix A and the vector s. The fact that the "noise" vector is not random is of no consequence to us, since it was shown by Impagliazzo and Naor that distinguishing (a, a · s mod q m ) from uniform is as hard as recovering s [IN96] . Thus the distribution (A, As+c mod q), which is just the base q representation of the previous distribution, is also computationally indistinguishable from uniform, based on the hardness of subset sum. The following theorem summarizes our main result: Theorem 1.1. For any integer q > 10n log 2 n, there exists a semantically secure cryptosystem encrypting k bits whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving the SS(n, q n+k ) problem.
Leakage-resilient public-key encryption. We show that a natural variant of our encryption scheme is resilient to any non-adaptive leakage of L(1 − o(1)) bits of its secret key, where L is the length of the secret key (see Appendix A.3 for the formal definition of non-adaptive key-leakage attacks). In this paper we deal with the non-adaptive setting of key leakage, and note that this notion of leakage is still very meaningful as it captures many realistic attacks in which the leakage does not depend on the parameters of the encryption scheme. For example, it captures the cold boot attacks of Halderman et al. [HSH + 08] , in which the leakage depends only on the properties of the hardware devices that are used for storing the secret key. We note that although Naor and Segev [NS09] presented a generic and rather simple construction that protects any public-key encryption scheme from non-adaptive leakage attacks, we show that for our specific scheme an even simpler modification suffices.
Oblivious transfer. We use our original encryption scheme to construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol that provides security for the receiver against a cheating sender and security for the sender against an honest-but-curious receiver. Our protocol is an instance of a natural construction used by Gertner et al. [GKM + 00], based on ideas of Even et al. [EGL82, EGL85] , to show that public-key encryption with a certain property implies two-message semi-honest OT. The property is roughly that public keys can be sampled "separately of private keys," while preserving the semantic security of the encryption. Pseudorandomness of subset sum implies that our encryption scheme satisfies this property.
Comparisons with Lattice-Based Schemes
To the best of our knowledge, the only other cryptosystems based on subset sum are those that are based on the worst-case hardness of the approximate unique shortest vector problem (uSVP γ ) [AD97, Reg03, Reg05, Pei09] . The cryptosystems of Regev [Reg03] and Peikert [Pei09] are both based on the hardness of uSVP n 1.5 (the latter is based on uSVP via a reduction in [LM09] ). What this means is that an algorithm that breaks these cryptosystems can be used to find the shortest vector in any lattice whose shortest vector is a factor of n 1.5 shorter than the next shortest vector that is not a multiple of it.
A reduction from the random subset sum problem to uSVP γ was given in [LO85, Fri86] . The exact parameter γ depends on the density of the subset sum instance. The smaller the density, the larger the γ can be, and the easier the uSVP γ problem becomes. The reduction from an instance of SS(n, M ) to uSVP γ is as follows:
Given an instance of SS(n, M ) consisting of a vector a ∈ Z n M and an element T ∈ Z M , we define the lattice L as
Notice that the vector x = [s||1] is in L for the s for which a · s mod M = T , so the 2 norm of the shortest vector is approximately √ n. The next shortest non-parallel vector is the vector that meets the Minkowski bound of
, which is a factor M 1/n larger than the shortest vector. Therefore solving uSVP n 1.5 allows us to solve instances of SS(n, M ) where M ≈ n 1.5n .
The cryptosystem that we construct in this paper is based on the hardness of SS(n, M ) where M ≈ n n . In order to have a lattice scheme based on the same subset sum assumption, it would need to be based on uSVP n . The construction of such a scheme is currently not known and would be considered a breakthrough.
We want to point out that we are not claiming that just because our scheme is based on a weaker instance of subset sum, it is somehow more secure than the lattice-based schemes. All we are claiming is that the connection of our scheme to the subset sum problem is better. In terms of security, the lattice-based schemes based on LWE [Reg05, Pei09] and our scheme are actually very similar because the LWE and subset sum problems can both be viewed as average-case instances of the "bounded distance decoding" problem, with essentially the same parameters but different distributions. Unfortunately, we do not know of any tight reduction between the two distributions, so there is no clear theoretical connection between LWE and subset sum.
In practice, though, there may be some advantages of our scheme over the lattice-based ones. The secret key in our scheme is an n-bit vector s ∈ {0, 1} n , whereas the secret keys in lattice-based schemes are on the order of n log n bits. Also, the public key in our scheme is a matrix A ∈ Z n×n q , whereas lattice-based schemes use an n × n log n matrix. The reason for the savings of a factor of log n in the size of both the secret and public keys in our scheme has to do with the fact that the distribution (A, As + c) is indistinguishable from random, where s ∈ {0, 1} n , based on the subset sum assumption. But in order to get a proof of security based on lattices, the vector s has to be chosen uniformly from Z n q (see [ACPS09] for a slight improvement), and is thus log n times longer. One can thus view our proof of security based on subset sum as justification that having s come from a smaller set and having the "noise" be a deterministic function of A and s, is still secure.
Open Problems
Our construction of the subset sum cryptosystem involves transforming the subset sum problem into something that very much resembles the LWE problem. It would be interesting to see whether the same type of idea could be used to transform other problems into LWE-type problems upon which semantically-secure cryptosystems can be built.
Another open problem concerns weakening the computational assumption underlying the multibit version of our scheme. While our one-bit cryptosystem is based on the hardness of solving instances of SS(n, q n ) for some q =Õ(n), when simultaneously encrypting k bits using the same randomness our cryptosystem becomes equivalent to the easier SS(n, q n+k ) problem (clearly, it is possible to encrypt k bits bit-by-bit, but this is less efficient). This is somewhat peculiar since one can simultaneously encrypt polynomially-many bits using the LWE cryptosystem without making the underlying assumption stronger [PVW08] , while simultaneously encrypting Ω(n 2 ) bits in our scheme is completely insecure (since the SS(n, q n 2 ) problem can be solved in polynomial time [LO85, Fri86] ). We believe that this weakness in the subset sum construction is due to the fact that the noise in the LWE schemes is generated independently, whereas in our scheme, the "noise" is just the carry bits. It is an interesting open problem to see whether one can modify our scheme so that its security does not depend on the number of bits being simultaneously encrypted using the same randomness.
Another interesting open problem concerns security against leakage attacks. First, we were not able to prove the security of our scheme against adaptive key-leakage attacks, in which the leakage can be chosen as a function of the public key as well. Although our scheme is somewhat similar to that of Akavia et al. [AGV09] , it seems that their approach for proving security against adaptive attacks does not immediately apply to our setting. Second, our leakage-resilient scheme relies on a slightly stronger assumption than our basic scheme, and it will be interesting to minimize the required computational assumption.
Finally, we leave it as an open problem to construct a CCA-secure scheme in the standard model based directly on subset sum. While there are CCA-secure encryption schemes based on lattice problems (and thus on subset sum as well) [PW08, Pei09] , it would be interesting to build one directly based on subset sum that will hopefully require weaker assumptions than the lattice based ones.
Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally define the subset sum problem and present notation that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we describe our encryption scheme. In Section 4 we show that a variant of our scheme is resilient to key leakage. Finally, in Section 5 we present an oblivious transfer protocol. For ease of reference, standard cryptographic definitions and tools used in our constructions are presented in Appendix A.
Preliminaries

The Subset Sum Problem
The subset sum problem with parameters n and q m , where n and m are integers and q is a positive integer such that 2 n < q m , is defined as follows: Given n numbers a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z q m and a target T ∈ Z q m , find a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that i∈S a i = T mod q m . This can be viewed as the problem of inverting the function f a : {0, 1} n → Z q m defined as
where a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ Z n q m is its index (i.e., this is a collection of functions, where a function is sampled by choosing its index a uniformly at random).
We denote by SS(n, q m ) the subset sum problem with parameters n and q m . Using the above notion, the hardness of the subset sum problem is the assumption that {f a } a∈Z n q m is a collection of one-way functions. We now state two properties of the subset sum problem that were proved by Impagliazzo and Naor [IN96] and are used in analyzing the security of our constructions. The first property is that subset sum instances with larger moduli are not harder than subset sum instances with smaller moduli. The second property is that if the subset sum is a one-way function, then it is also a pseudorandom generator. In the following two statements, we fix n, m and q as above.
Lemma 2.1 ([IN96]).
For any integers i and j such that i < j, if q m+i > 2 n , then the hardness of SS(n, q m+j ) implies the hardness of SS(n, q m+i ).
Lemma 2.2 ([IN96]
). The hardness of SS(n, q m ) implies that the distributions (a, f a (s)) and (a, t) are computationally indistinguishable, where a ∈ Z n q m , s ∈ {0, 1} n , and t ∈ Z q m are chosen independently and uniformly at random. 4
Notation
We represent vectors by bold-case letters and all vectors will be assumed to be column vectors. Unless stated otherwise, all scalar and vector operations are performed modulo q. For simplicity, we will assume that q is odd, but our results follow for all q with minimal changes. We represent elements in Z q by integers in the range [−(q − 1)/2, (q − 1)/2]. For an element e ∈ Z q , its length, denoted by |e| is the absolute value of its representative in the range [−(q − 1)/2, (q − 1)/2]. For a vector e = (e 1 , . . . , e m ) ∈ Z m q , we define e ∞ = max 1≤i≤m |e i |. We now present some notation that is convenient for describing the subset sum function. For a matrix A ∈ Z m×n q and a vector s ∈ {0, 1} n , we define A s as the vector t T = (t 0 , . . . , t m−1 ) such that |t i | ≤ (q − 1)/2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
In other words, we interpret the n columns of A as elements in Z q m represented in base q, and sum all the elements in the columns j where s j = 1. The result is an element in Z q m , which we write in base q using coefficients between −(q −1)/2 and (q −1)/2. We then write the coefficients of the base q representation as an m-dimensional vector t. It will sometimes be more convenient to consider the subset sum of the numbers represented by the rows of A, and to this effect we naturally define r T A = A T r T .
The Encryption Scheme
In this section we present our main contribution: a public-key encryption scheme that is based directly on the hardness of the subset sum problem. Given a security parameter n, we set q(n) to be some number greater than 10n log 2 n, let k ∈ N be the number of bits we want to encrypt, and define the following encryption scheme: -Key generation: On input 1 n sample A ∈ Z n×n q and s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ {0, 1} n independently and uniformly at random. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k let t i = A s i , and let A = [A ||t 1 || · · · ||t k ]. Output P K = A and SK = (s 1 , . . . , s k ).
-Encryption: On input a message z ∈ {0, 1} k , sample r ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random, and output the ciphertext u T = r T A + (
The intuition for the semantic security of the scheme is fairly simple. Because the vectors t i are subset sums of the numbers represented by the columns of A , the public key A is computationally indistinguishable from random. Therefore, to an observer, the vector r T A, which is a subset sum of numbers represented by the rows of A, is again computationally indistinguishable from uniform. The formal proof is in Section 3.1.
The intuition for decryption is based on the fact that A s i ≈ A s i and r T A ≈ r T A. For simplicity, assume that A s i = A s i and r T A = r T A. Then it is not hard to see that
and we recover z i . Because the subset sum function does not quite correspond to a vector/matrix multiplication, decryption will recover q−1 2 z i + error. What we will need to show is that this error term is small enough so that we can still tell whether z i was 0 or 1. The proof is in Section 3.2.
Proof of Security
Our scheme enjoys a rather simple and direct proof of security. The proof consists of two applications of the pseudorandomness of the subset sum function, which by Lemma 2.2 is implied by the hardness of the subset sum problem. Informally, the first application allows us to replace the values A s 1 , . . . , A s k in the public key with k vectors that are sampled independently and uniformly at random. Then, the second application allows us to replace the value r T A in the challenge ciphertext with an independently and uniformly chosen vector. In this case, the challenge ciphertext is statistically independent of the encrypted message and the security of the scheme follows. More formally, the following theorem establishes the security of the scheme:
Theorem 3.1. Assuming the hardness of the SS(n, q n+k ) problem, where n is the security parameter and k is the plaintext length, the above public-key encryption scheme is semantically secure.
Proof. We show that for any two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} k , the ensembles (P K, E P K (m 0 )) and (P K, E P K (m 1 )) are computationally indistinguishable. In fact, we prove an even stronger statement, namely that (A, r T A) is computationally indistinguishable from (M, v), where M ∈ Z n×(n+k) q and v ∈ Z n+k q are sampled independently and uniformly at random. This, in turn, implies that for every b ∈ {0, 1}, the distribution (P K, E P K (m b )) is computationally indistinguishable from a distribution that perfectly hides the message m b . Therefore, any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary attacking the scheme will have a negligible cpa-advantage.
The hardness of the SS(n, q n ) problem, Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, and a standard hybrid argument imply that the distributions (A , A s 1 , . . . , A s k ) and (A , b 1 , . . . , b k ), where b 1 , . . . , b k ∈ Z n q are sampled independently and uniformly at random, are computationally indistinguishable. Letting M = [A ||b 1 || · · · ||b k ], it then follows that the distributions (A, r T A) and (M, r T M), are computationally indistinguishable. Now, the hardness of the SS(n, q n+k ) problem and Lemma 2.2 imply that the latter distribution is computationally indistinguishable from (M, v), where v ∈ Z n+k q is sampled uniformly at random, independently of M. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Correctness
We will use the following bound due to Hoeffding [Hoe63] throughout our proof.
Lemma 3.2 (Hoeffding Bound). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random variables in the range [a, b] and let X = X 1 + . . . + X n . Then
The next lemma shows that the carries during the subset sum operation r T A are distributed with mean 0 and their absolute value is bounded (with high probability) by √ n log n. In addition, the carries are almost independent of each other. The slight dependency comes from the fact that a carry element can cause the following carry to increase by 1.
Lemma 3.3. For any n, m ∈ N and r ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Furthermore, the vector r T A − r T A can be written as a sum of two vectors x, y ∈ Z m q where all the coordinates of x are independently distributed with mean 0, while all the coordinates of y have absolute value at most 1 (but could be dependent among themselves).
Proof. Computing r T A can be done via the following algorithm, where a i is the i-th column of A:
Notice that this algorithm is just performing addition in base q, where all the coefficients are between −(q − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2. The difference r T A − r T A is simply the "carries" c i . Note that the only dependency among the c i 's is that c i+1 slightly depends on c i . We can rewrite the above algorithm by writing each c i as x i + y i such that all the x i 's are independent among themselves, whereas the y i 's could be dependent but are very small.
Notice that in the second algorithm, the x i 's are completely independent among themselves. We now bound the absolute value of the x i 's. Each vector a i consists of numbers uniformly distributed between −(q − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2. Applying the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 3.2), we obtain that
Therefore, with probability 1 − n −ω(1) , |x i | ≤ √ n log n for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Also notice that by symmetry, E[x i ] = 0. By induction, we will now show that |y i | ≤ 1. This is true for y 0 , and assume it is true for y i . Then,
where the last inequality follows because |x i | ≤ √ n log n < q/2 − 1 and |y i | ≤ 1, and so
Lemma 3.4. For any r, s ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Proof. Using Lemma 3.3, we can rewrite r T A as r T A + x T + y T where each element of x is independently distributed around 0 with magnitude at most √ n log n, and each element of y has magnitude at most 1. Multiplying by s, we obtain (r T A)s − r T As = x T s + y T s.
Because y ∞ ≤ 1, we have |y T s| ≤ n. By the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 3.2), we obtain that
, and the lemma is proved.
Theorem 3.5. Decryption succeeds with probability 1 − n −ω(1) .
Proof. The encryption of a message z is the vector u T = r T A+(
2 )(0 n ||z T ). To decrypt bit i, we write u T = [v T ||w 1 || . . . ||w k ] and compute v T s i −w i . Observe that v T is equal to r T A +(0 n−1 ||ν) and w i = r T t i + q−1 2 z i + η, where ν, η are carries whose magnitudes are less than n (actually, we can show that with high probability ν, η < √ n log n, but the looser bound suffices here). Therefore,
where s n is the last element of s i . We will now show that q−1 2 z i is the dominant term in the second equation. Therefore, if z i = 0, the result will be close to 0, and if z i = 1, the result will be close to −(q − 1)/2. We will show this by bounding the magnitude of the other terms.
≤ n log 2 n + n log 2 n + 2n , where the last inequality follows from applying Lemma 3.4 to bound (r T A )s i − r T A s i and applying it one more time to bound r T (A s i ) − r T A s i . So if z i = 0, we will have
with probability 1 − n −ω(1) , and we will decrypt to 0. If z i = 1, we will have
and we will decrypt to 1.
Security Against Key-Leakage Attacks
In this section we prove that a natural variant of the scheme described in Section 3 is resilient to any non-adaptive leakage of L(1 − o(1)) bits, where L is the length of the secret key (see Appendix A.3 for the formal definition of non-adaptive key-leakage attacks). Given a security parameter n and a leakage parameter λ = λ(n), set q = O n + λ log n n log 2 n , T = √ q, and m ≥ ( n log q + λ + ω(log n)) / log T . Consider the following encryption scheme: The main idea underlying the scheme is that the min-entropy of the secret key is m log T ≥ n log q +λ+ω(log n), and therefore even given any leakage of λ bits it still has average min-entropy at least n log q + ω(log n). The fact that the leakage is independent of the public key enables us to apply the leftover hash lemma and argue that A = [A ||A s] is statistically-close to uniform, even given the leakage.
We note that in this scheme, unlike in the scheme presented in Section 3, we use matrixvector multiplication instead of the subset sum operation in forming the public key. The proof of correctness in this case is similar to that presented in Section 3. Specifically, a generalization of Lemma 3.4 shows that for every r ∈ {0, 1} n and s ∈ {−(T − 1)/2, . . . , (T − 1)/2} m , with overwhelming probability over the choice of A $ ← Z n×m q it holds that (r T A)s − r T As ∞ < √ T mn log 2 n + T m. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, this implies that
where |γ| ≤ √ T mn log 2 n + (T + 2)m, and therefore we need to set q to be any integer such that q/4 > √ T mn log 2 n+(T +2)m. By setting roughly q = n + λ log n n log 2 n (ignoring a small leading constant) and T = √ q, we can base the security of the scheme on the hardness of the SS(n, q m ) problem, where
The following theorem establishes the security of the scheme:
Theorem 4.1. Assuming the hardness of the SS(n, q m+1 ) problem for q = q(n) and m = m(n) as above, the scheme is semantically secure against non-adaptive λ(n)-key-leakage attacks, where n is the security parameter.
Proof. We show that for any efficiently computable leakage function f mapping secret keys into {0, 1} λ , the ensembles (P K, E P K (0), f (SK)) and (P K, E P K (1), f (SK)) are computationally indistinguishable. In fact, we prove even a stronger statement, showing that (A,
and v ∈ Z m+1 q are sampled independently and uniformly at random.
Lemma A.1 guarantees that the average min-entropy of s given f (s) is at least m log T − λ ≥ n log q + ω(log n), and therefore the leftover hash lemma (when adapted to the notion of average min-entropy -see Lemma A.3) implies that the statistical distance between the distributions (A , A s, f (s)) and (A , t, f (s)) where t ∈ Z n q is sampled uniformly at random is negligible in n. Letting M = [A ||t] and noting that applying a deterministic function cannot increase the statistical distance between distributions, it then follows that the statistical distance between (A, r T A, f (s)) and (M, r T M, f (s)) where M ∈ Z n×(m+1) q is sampled uniformly at random is negligible. Now, the hardness of the SS(n, q m+1 ) problem implies that the latter distribution is computationally indistinguishable from (M, v, f (s)), where v ∈ Z m+1 q is sampled uniformly at random and independently of M, and this concludes the proof of the theorem.
Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section we present an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol based on subset sum that provides security for the receiver against a cheating sender, and security for the sender against an honest-butcurious receiver. (See Appendix A.4 for the formal definition of oblivious transfer.) Our protocol is an instance of a construction proposed by Gertner et al. [GKM + 00], based on protocols by Even et al. [EGL82, EGL85] , to show that a special property of public-key encryption is sufficient for the construction of two-message semi-honest OT. Informally, the property is that it is possible to efficiently sample a string P K with a distribution indistinguishable from that of a properly generated public key, while preserving the semantic security of the encryption E P K . Our encryption scheme satisfies this property, by pseudorandomness of subset sum. For the sake of self-containment, however, we provide direct proofs of our OT protocol's correctness and security.
OT Based on Subset Sum
Our oblivious transfer protocol is a simple application of our encryption scheme. We denote by G, E and D, respectively, the key-generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of the public-key encryption scheme described in Section 3. The receiver with inputs 1 n , b first sends a properly generated public key P K b and a uniformly random fake public key P K 1−b ∈ Z n×(n+k) q . The sender with inputs 1 n , z 0 , z 1 uses each key P K i to encrypt its input z i and replies with the ciphertexts u T 0 , u T 1 . The receiver can then retrieve z b by decrypting u T b , using the secret key corresponding to P K b . Details follow.
Let n, k ∈ N, b ∈ {0, 1}, and z 0 , z 1 ∈ {0, 1} k Receiver R(1 n , b):
Proofs of Correctness and Security
We now show that correctness follows directly from correctness of the cryptosystem.
Theorem 5.1. If the sender and receiver both follow the protocol, then the former outputs nothing and the latter outputs z b with probability 1 − n −ω(1) .
Proof. Since P K b is a properly generated public key corresponding to secret key SK b , u T b is a valid encryption of message z b under P K b , and the receiver computes the decryption of u T b using SK b , the proof follows from Theorem 3.5.
Security for the receiver is proved based on the pseudorandomness of subset sum. A properly generated public key is indistinguishable from a uniformly random element in Z n×(n+k) q . Therefore, for any input bit, the receiver's message consists of two elements from computationally indistinguishable distributions. It follows that the distribution of the receiver's message when the input is 0 is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution when the input is 1. The precise statement of this result is the following.
Theorem 5.2. Assuming the hardness of the SS(n, q n ) problem, where n is the security parameter, the above OT protocol is secure for the receiver.
Proof. Let R(1 n , b) denote the message sent by the honest receiver with inputs 1 n , b. We show that the ensembles R(1 n , 0) and R(1 n , 1) are computationally indistinguishable.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the hardness of the SS(n, q n ) problem implies that the distributions P K 0 and P K 1 are computationally indistinguishable. This implies that the ensembles R(1 n , 0) and R(1 n , 1) are computationally indistinguishable as well.
The protocol is not secure against malicious receivers. Indeed, a malicious receiver can properly generate two key pairs P K 0 , SK 0 and P K 1 , SK 1 , and then use the secret keys to decrypt both ciphertexts u T 0 , u T 1 . The protocol is, however, secure for the sender against honest-but-curious receivers, as we now show.
Theorem 5.3. Assuming the hardness of the SS(n, q n+k ) problem, where n is the security parameter and k is the length of the sender's input messages, the above OT protocol is secure for the sender against an honest-but-curious receiver.
Proof. Let R(1 n , b) denote the message sent by the honest receiver with inputs 1 n , b, and S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , R(1 n , b)) denote the reply of the honest sender with inputs 1 n , z 0 , z 1 . We show that the ensembles (S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , R(1 n , 0)), R(1 n , 0)) and (S(1 n , z 0 , 0 k , R(1 n , 0)), R(1 n , 0)) are computationally indistinguishable, and the ensembles (S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , R(1 n , 1)), R(1 n , 1)) and (S(1 n , 0 k , z 1 , R(1 n , 1)), R(1 n , 1)) are computationally indistinguishable.
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we showed that for any two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} k the ensembles (P K, E P K (m 0 )) and (P K, E P K (m 1 )) are computationally indistinguishable. This is true when P K is a properly generated public key and also when P K is a random element in Z n×(n+k) q . Therefore, the ensembles (P K 1−b , E P K 1−b (z 1−b )) and (P K 1−b , E P K 1−b (0 k )) are computationally indistinguishable. Hence for b ∈ {0, 1} the ensembles (S(1 n , z b , z 1−b , R(1 n , b) ), R(1 n , b)) and (S(1 n , z b , 0 k , R(1 n , b)), R(1 n , b)) are computationally indistinguishable. This completes the proof.
A Cryptographic Definitions
A.1 Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (G, E, D) is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms: a public/secret key pair is generated via (P K, SK) $ ← G(1 n ), where n is the security parameter; a message M is encrypted via C $ ← E P K (M ); and a ciphertext C is decrypted via M ← D SK (C). It is required that D SK (E P K (M )) = M with overwhelming probability for all (P K, SK) that can be output by G(1 n ) and every message M .
We recall the definition of security against chosen-plaintext attack that originated in [GM84] . Associate to PKE and n ∈ N the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
The challenger runs G(1 n ) to generate a pair (P K, SK) and sends P K to A. A outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 . The challenger chooses a random bit b $ ← {0, 1}, computes C $ ← E P K (M b ), and sends C to A. Finally, A outputs a bit d
The cpa-advantage of A against PKE at n is defined as
We say that PKE is secure against chosen-plaintext attack or, equivalently, semantically secure, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the cpa-advantage of A against PKE at n grows negligibly in n.
the cold boot attacks of Halderman et al. [HSH + 08] , in which the leakage depends only on the properties of the hardware devices that are used for storing the secret key.
Formally, for a public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D) we denote by SK n and PK n the sets of secret keys and public keys that are produced by G(1 n ). That is, G(1 n ) : {0, 1} * → SK n × PK n for every n ∈ N. The following defines the notion of a non-adaptive key-leakage attack:
Definition A.4 (non-adaptive key-leakage attacks). A public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D) is semantically secure against non-adaptive λ(n)-key-leakage attacks if for any collection F = f n : SK n → {0, 1} λ(n) n∈N of efficiently computable functions, and for any two messages m 0 and m 1 , the distributions (P K, E P K (m 0 ), f n (SK)) and (P K, E P K (m 1 ), f n (SK)) are computationally indistinguishable, where (SK, P K) $ ← G(1 n ).
A.4 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a cryptographic primitive, introduced by Rabin [Rab81] , which has been shown to be sufficiently strong to enable any multiparty computation [Yao86, GMW87, Kil88] . There are several equivalent formulations of OT in the literature. We use the version of Even, et al. [EGL85] , known as 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and refer to it as simply OT. Crépeau [Cré87] showed that this variant is equivalent to the original definition of oblivious transfer.
A 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is a two-party protocol in which a sender has two secret strings z 0 , z 1 and a receiver has a secret bit b. At the end of the interaction, the receiver learns z b but has no information about z 1−b , and the sender learns nothing about b. General OT guarantees security even in the face of cheating parties who deviate from the prescribed protocol. Honest OT, on the other hand, guarantees security only against honest-but-curious parties. These are parties that follow the protocol, but keep a record of all intermediate results and may perform any computation to extract additional information from this record, once the protocol ends. Any honest OT protocol can be transformed into a general OT protocol, using either black-box techniques [Hai08] , or using zero-knowledge proofs to force parties to behave in an honest-but-curious manner [Gol04] . The formal definition of OT follows.
Definition A.5. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a two-party protocol involving a sender S with inputs 1 n and z 0 , z 1 ∈ {0, 1} k , where k is a constant, and a receiver R with inputs 1 n and b ∈ {0, 1}. S and R are polynomial-time randomized algorithms such that if both follow the protocol, then the former outputs nothing and the latter outputs z b (with overwhelming probability). We consider the following security requirements:
Security for the receiver: Let R(1 n , b) denote the message sent by the honest receiver with inputs 1 n , b. Then the ensembles {R(1 n , 0)} n∈N and {R(1 n , 1)} n∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
Security for the sender: Let S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , m) denote the message sent by the honest sender with inputs 1 n , z 0 , z 1 when the (possibly cheating, polynomial time) receiver's message is m. Then for every z 0 , z 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and every polynomial-length message m ∈ {0, 1} * , either the ensembles {S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , m), m} n∈N and {S(1 n , z 0 , 0 k , m), m} n∈N or the ensembles {S(1 n , z 0 , z 1 , m), m} n∈N and {S(1 n , 0 k , z 1 , m), m} n∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
Security against honest-but-curious (a.k.a. "semi-honest") receivers relaxes the second condition above to consider only a receiver that faithfully follows the protocol, but keeps a record of all intermediate results and may perform any computation, after the protocol is completed, to extract additional information from this record.
